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Adelante!  
Military imaginaries, the Cold War and southern Africa’s 
liberation armies1 
 
 
Studies of southern Africa’s liberation movements have turned attention to the great 
importance of their transnational lives, but they have rarely focused on the effects of 
military training provided by Cold War-era allies in sites across the globe. This is a 
significant omission in the history of these movements: training turns civilians into 
soldiers and creates armies with not only military but also social and political effects, 
as scholarship on conventional militaries has long emphasized. Liberation movement 
armies differ from conventional armies, however. They were not subordinated to a 
single state, instead receiving training under the flexible rubric of international 
solidarity in a host of foreign sites and in interaction with a great variety of military 
traditions. We argue that the training provided in this context produced multiple 
‘military imaginaries’ within liberation movement armies, at once creating deep 
tensions and enabling innovation. The article is based on oral histories of Zimbabwe 
People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) veterans who were trained by Cuban and 
Soviet instructors in Angola in the late 1970s. These soldiers emerged from the 
Angolan camps with a military imaginary they summed up in the Cuban exhortation 
‘Adelante!’ (Forward!). Forty years later, they stressed how different their training 
had made them from other ZIPRA cadres, in terms of their military strategy, mastery 
of advanced Soviet weaponry and aggressive disposition, as well as their 
‘revolutionary’ performance of politics and masculinity in modes of address, salute, 
and drill. Such military imaginaries powerfully shaped the southern African 
battlefield. They also offer novel insight into the distinctive institutions, identities and 
memories forged through Cold War-era military exchanges. 
 
Key words: military training, military imaginary, Cold War, liberation 
movement armies, international solidarity, Zimbabwe, Angola, Cuba, ZIPRA, 
ZAPU 
 
Introduction 
                                                        
1 We owe a great debt to Zephaniah Nkomo of the Mafela Trust, an organization of veterans devoted to 
ZIPRA history, to the Bulawayo-based historian Pathisa Nyathi, and to ZIPRA veteran Zephaniah 
Moyo, all of whom provided invaluable insights and introductions to interviewees, as they have done 
over many years. Nkomo and Nyathi participated in many of our interviews, offering guidance and 
advice. This research would not have been possible without them. Our deepest gratitude is owed to 
those former ZIPRA soldiers who told us their stories. The article has also benefited greatly from the 
comments of the journal’s anonymous reviewers. We owe thanks too to the Leverhulme Trust, which 
has funded further work on this topic through the ‘Global Soldiers in the Cold War: Making Southern 
Africa’s Liberation Armies’ project (grant RPG-2019-198). 
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In the final years of Zimbabwe’s liberation war, Cuban and Soviet instructors 
stationed in Angola trained over 6,000 ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary 
Army) soldiers. According to Jorge Valdes Risquet, head of the Cuban civilian 
mission in Angola, this was ‘possibly the largest school of this kind in the world’.2 By 
the end of the war, the Angolan-trained groups constituted close to a third of ZIPRA’s 
forces,3 and would prove vital to the introduction of conventional tactics in the 
guerrilla war fought by the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) against 
Rhodesia’s settler government. Forty years later, these Angolan-trained men retained 
a strong sense of their military identity. They held that their training had made them a 
formidably fierce, technically advanced fighting force with a particular idea of 
revolutionary warfare summed up in the Cuban cry ‘Adelante!’ (Forward!). This 
military vision had set them apart, they said, from other ZIPRA cadres, and 
sometimes brought them into conflict with them. Despite its significance in the past 
and in the present lives of veterans, the experience of these men is little more than a 
footnote in studies of the Cold War in the region and barely features in Zimbabwe’s 
liberation war history, which has been dominated by ZAPU’s counterpart, the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the eventual victor in the country’s post-
war elections.4 
 International military training powerfully shaped every southern African 
liberation movement, but the nature of these military exchanges – even for the victors 
– has rarely been subjected to close scrutiny. We explore the genesis and effects of 
‘Adelante!’ in ZIPRA’s war in order to begin to write the complex histories of such 
Cold War-era military exchanges. In doing so, we adapt the concept of ‘military 
imaginaries’ developed by Andrew Bickford in his study of soldiers in the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) and their experience of German reunification. In 
Bickford’s account, the military imaginary is produced by the state: it encompasses 
‘the ways in which the necessity, implementation, and desired outcomes of 
(compulsory) military service and training are imagined and envisioned by the state, 
and the ways in which these tropes are linked to normative ideas of the “proper” 
                                                        
2 Quoted in Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the Struggle for 
Southern Africa, 1976-1991 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2013), p. 86. Starting in 
July/August 1977, three groups of roughly 2,000 men were sequentially given 6 months of training by 
Cuban and Soviet instructors, while a fourth group was trained by ZIPRA itself. See Gleijeses, Visions, 
pp. 86-7; Vladimir Shubin, The Hot ‘Cold War’: The USSR in Southern Africa (London, Pluto Press, 
2008), p. 171-3; Abel Mazinyane, ‘Zim, Angola Friendship has Stood Test of Time’, Sunday News, 16 
November 2014; and interviews below. 
3 Jeremy Brickhill, ‘Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU, 1976-1979’, in 
Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds), Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (London, James 
Currey, 1995), pp. 65-6, estimates that there were 20,000 trained ZIPRA soldiers at the end of the war. 
Also see Eliakim Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 1961-87: A Political History of 
Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia (Trenton, NJ, Africa World Press, 2005), p. 219.   
4 The most detailed accounts of ZIPRA in Angola are Shubin, The Hot ‘Cold War’, pp. 171-3, and 
Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 86-7. The case is not considered in Odd Arne Westad’s magnum opus, The 
Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). It is unsurprisingly ignored in David Martin and Phyllis Johnson’s pro-ZANU 
account, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (London, Faber and Faber, 1981), but also goes unnoted in work 
by ZAPU insiders Brickhill, ‘Daring to Storm’, and Dumiso Dabengwa, ‘ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War 
of National Liberation’, in Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. ZAPU President Joshua Nkomo, 
Nkomo: The Story of My Life (London, Methuen, 1984), pp. 177-78, offers one (glowing) sentence on 
Cuban training; Sibanda, Zimbabwe, p. 209, makes a brief aside. Mentions in work on the Rhodesian 
Security Forces are cursory, e.g., H. Ellert, Rhodesian Front War: Counter-insurgency and guerrilla 
warfare 1962-1980 (Gweru, Mambo Press, 1993), pp. 77-8, and Preller Geldenhuys’ memoir, 
Rhodesian Air Force Operations (Paysoft Publishing, 2014), pp. 235-69.  
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soldier and man, legitimate violence, morality and military tradition’.5 The role of the 
state is overweening: as he puts it, ‘the soldier is the state’, even if the memories and 
histories of the state and soldier are rendered contentious by political change.6 In 
identifying the soldier with a state project, Bickford carries forward a major theme in 
the study of conventional militaries across the globe.7 But what happens when there is 
no state to anchor the military imaginary?  
The liberation movement armies that fought Southern Africa’s intransigent 
settler states were based in military camps in exile and were loyal to nationalist 
political movements that certainly dreamed of a state, but did not have one. In the 
1960s and 1970s, these movements depended on political relationships with ‘hosts’ 
among the newly independent African states to their north, mediated by the nascent 
regional organizations of the Frontline States and the Organization of African Unity. 
More distant powers, notably Eastern Bloc states but also Cuba, India, China and 
others, offered military training and other kinds of support under the rubric of 
international solidarity. In the case of ZAPU, cadres were trained in Ghana, China, 
Egypt, Algeria, Cuba, North Korea, the USSR, GDR, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Libya, and even Lebanon (where a small group of ZIPRA men 
trained and fought with the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO]), in addition to 
the major military camps in Tanzania, Zambia and Angola. In these latter, instructors 
came from within ZIPRA, the Zambian army, Cuba, the USSR and elsewhere.8 
Within such liberation movement armies, a multitude of military imaginaries were 
thus constructed, tested, discarded, or allowed to co-exist over time.9 
The regimes under which the Cold War-era training of liberation movements 
took place was thus a far cry from the disciplinary oversight provided by a single 
state. This complexity helps to explain the deep tensions that bedeviled all liberation 
movement armies, as well as the nature of the wars they fought and soldiers’ 
memories thereof. Exploring their military imaginaries allows us to make several 
broader arguments. First, we bring to light a crucial aspect of Cold War-era exchange 
that scholars have neglected – military training – and thus add a new dimension to the 
burgeoning work on both the ‘global’ Cold War and the transnational character of 
                                                        
5 Andrew Bickford, Fallen Elites: The Military Other in Post-Unification Germany (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 2011), p. 4. 
6 Bickford, Fallen Elites, pp. 3, 5. 
7 See for example Paul Highgate (ed), Military Masculinities: Identity and the State (Santa Barbara, 
CA, Praeger Press, 2003); Lesley Gill ‘Creating Citizens, Making Men: The Military and Masculinity 
in Bolivia’ Cultural Anthropology, 12, 4, 1997: 527-50; Catherine Lutz, ‘Making War At Home and in 
the United States: Militarization and the Current Crisis’, American Anthropologist, 104, 3, 2002: 723-
35; Kevin McSorley (ed), War and the Body: Militarisation, Practice and Experience (London, 
Routledge, 2013). 
8 See Stanley Nleya’s first-hand account in ‘Guerrilla Training was No Picnic’, Sunday News 
(Bulawayo), 20 March 2016, and Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, ‘African Soldiers in the 
USSR: ZAPU Intelligence Cadres Oral Histories of Soviet Training, 1964-1979’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 43, 1, 2017, pp. 49-66; Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, ‘War Stories: 
Guerrilla Narratives of Zimbabwe's Liberation War’, History Workshop Journal, 75, 1, 2004, pp. 79-
100; Natalia Krylova, ‘Le Centre Perevalnoe et la formation de militaires en Union Sovietique’, 
Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 2, 2017, pp. 399-416. 
9 See Dumiso Dabengwa’s account of the heated debates in 1964 among a group of 100 ZAPU men 
who reconvened in Zambia after training in the USSR, China, North Korea, Cuba and Egypt: 
‘Relations between ZAPU and the USSR, 1960s-1970s: A Personal View’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 43, 1, 2017, pp. 218-19. For parallel debates in ZANU, see Martin and Johnson, The 
Struggle, pp. 27-8. In contrast to ZIPRA, the training of ZANU’s armed wing became more 
homogenous over time.  
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southern African liberation movements.10 Within the latter literature, we add a new 
element to the rich debates over the role in the making of liberation movements of 
‘the camp’. Scholars have focused on everyday life and political and social relations 
within camps located largely in Angola, Zambia and Tanzania, and often cast them as 
spaces in which repressive authority was made and contested.11 Few studies examine 
the making of soldiers per se, however, thus obscuring enduring military identities.12 
Second, highlighting liberation armies’ plural and political military imaginaries adds a 
new dimension to scholarship on military training itself. Liberation movement armies 
clearly differed from the conventional state militaries that have dominated debates 
over training and its effects. They also differed from the armies discussed under the 
rubric of ‘new wars’ and other forms of post-Cold War insurgency. These rebel 
movements, which also produced military imaginaries beyond the reach of a state, 
developed modes of training that were usually far more dispersed, localized, and 
informal.13 While backing from external states often mattered in ‘new wars’, the scale 
and duration of military assistance received by Cold War-era liberation movements 
and the politics of internationalist solidarities were distinctive. Liberation armies’ 
experiences of training thus tell us about the making of highly unusual militaries at a 
particular historical moment. 
 Before turning to ZIPRA’s story, we consider how the study of military 
training has been approached in recent scholarship and set out our own methodology. 
 
Military Training and Soldiers’ Oral Histories  
                                                        
10 On the former, see the agenda-setting work of Westad, The Global Cold War. On the latter, see 
Hilary Sapire and Chris Saunders (eds), Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa in Context: New 
Local, Regional and Global Perspectives (Claremont, UCT Press, 2013); Lena Dallywater, Chris 
Saunders and Helder Adegar Fonseca (eds), Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global 
Cold War ‘East’: Transnational Activism 1960-1990 (Oldenbourg, De Gruyter, 2019); and Jocelyn 
Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Blessing-Miles Tendi, ‘The Transnational Histories of Southern 
African Liberation Movements: An Introduction’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 43, 1, 2017, pp. 
1-12.   
11 See Christian Williams’ exemplary study, National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa: A 
Historical Ethnography of SWAPO’s Exile Camps (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
and the large literature on the armed wing of the South African ANC (African National Congress), 
inter alia, Maria Suriano and Ariana Lissoni, ‘Married to the ANC: Tanzanian women’s entanglement 
in South Africa’s liberation struggle’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 40, 1 (2014), pp. 129-50, 
Stephen  Ellis, External Mission: The ANC in Exile 1960-1990 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2012), and Hugh Macmillan, The Lusaka Years: The ANC in Exile, 1963-1994 (Auckland Park, Jacana 
Media, 2013).  
12 Memoir is the medium that has provided the most detailed accounts. For the ANC, see e.g. Stanley 
Manong, If We Must Die: An Autobiography of a Former Commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe (Cape 
Town, Nkululeko Publishers, 2014), and James Ngculu, The Honour to Serve: Recollections of an 
Umkhonto Soldier (Johannesburg, David Philip, Johannesburg, 2009); for ZANU, Agrippah 
Mutambara, The Rebel in Me: A ZANLA Guerrilla Commander in the Rhodesian Bush War, 1975-1980 
(Warwick, Helion and Company, 2014). Also see Stephen Davis’ important recent work on the ANC, 
especially his consideration of the movement’s Angolan camp regime, The ANC’s War Against 
Apartheid: Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Liberation of South Africa (Bloomington, Indiana University 
Press, 2018), chapter 4, and Helder Adegar Fonseca’s examination of Angolan movements’ training 
through Portuguese intelligence records, in ‘The Military Training of Angolan Guerrillas in Socialist 
Countries’ in Dallywater et al (eds), Southern African Liberation Movements, pp. 103-29. 
13 On training in West African insurgencies, see Danny Hoffman, The War Machines: Young Men and 
Violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 2011), and Paul Richards, 
Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford, James Currey, 
1996). A detailed discussion of the many forms of post-Cold War insurgency is beyond the scope of 
this article.  
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Training occupies a central place in scholarship on militaries, both in longstanding 
strategic and technical approaches to war and in the newer field of critical military 
studies. These studies are marked by a division between a ‘conventional war 
scholarship’, in which soldiers are cast as elements to be deployed in a fighting force, 
the efficiency and efficacy of which is the main concern, and a focus on ‘lived 
experiences’, embodied practices and emotions, framed within critical approaches to 
state and society.14  
The first tradition of writing tends towards instrumentalist accounts of 
training. The historian Hew Strachan, for example, locates the value of training in its 
capacity to counter boredom, generate professional pride and ‘unit cohesion’, and 
enable soldiers to master technology and ‘assimilate new tactical thinking to the point 
where it becomes instinctive in its application’.15 Similarly, the military sociologist 
Dan Snider has characterized the ‘military culture’ produced in training as the ‘glue’ 
that holds units together. Officers’ socialization of soldiers, he argues, works by 
cultivating shared values, norms and expectations able to shape ‘attitudes and 
behaviors about what is right and what is good and important, often manifested in 
shared heroes, stories and rituals that promote bonding’.16 Historians of colonial 
armies such as Tarak Barkawi have argued that military training was the essential 
element in creating ‘group solidarity’ within otherwise highly diverse armies, such as 
the Indian Army in the Second World War.17 
The second tradition stresses the power of training too, but foregrounds 
soldiers’ responses to and perceptions and memories of military regimes, often using 
ethnographic methods or relying on soldiers’ written and oral accounts. Training is 
explored in relation to the emotional and embodied aspects of military hierarchies, 
masculinities and social identities, and their connection to citizenship, ideology and 
societal militarization.18 This strand of writing is concerned with state projects of 
‘control and transformation’ as well as soldiers’ responses to them.19 In her study of 
British conscripts in the Second World War, for example, Emma Newlands 
scrutinizes soldiers’ stories, memoirs, letters and diaries and finds a variety of public 
and private tactics of resistance: ‘the body’, she writes, ‘was difficult to control and to 
be controlled. Ultimately, it was an unstable object for power’.20   
Both strands of scholarship have shaped our approach to ZIPRA soldiers and 
to the military imaginaries fostered among them through training. ZIPRA veterans’ 
                                                        
14 McSorley, War and the Body, pp. 1-2. The same distinction is made in Eyal Ben-Ari, Mastering 
Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit (Oxford, Berghahn, 1998), pp. 
2-3. 
15 Hew Strachan, ‘Training, Morale and Modern War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 41, 2, 2006, 
p. 216.  
16 Don Snider, ‘An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture’, Orbis, 43, 1, 1999, p. 14.  
17 Tarak Barkawi, ‘Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World War’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, 41, 2, 2006, pp. 350-54.  
18 This is a diverse, discipline-crossing literature. See e.g. McSorley, War and the  Body, p. 2; 
Bickford, Fallen Elites; Gill, ‘Creating Citizens’; Matthew Guttman and Catherine Lutz, Breaking 
Ranks: Iraq Veterans Speak Out Against the War (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2010); 
Ben-Ari, Mastering Soldiers; David H. J. Morgan, ‘Theater of War: Combat, the Military, and 
Masculinities’, in Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman (eds), Theorizing Masculinities (London, Sage, 
1994); Pearl Katz, ‘Emotional Metaphors, Socialization and Roles of Drill Sergeants’, Ethos, 18, 4, 
1990, pp. 457-80; Kenneth MacLeish, ‘How to Feel about War: On Soldiers’ Psyches, Military 
Biopolitics and American Empire’, Biosocieties, 14, 3, 2018.  
19 Emma Newlands, ‘Preparing and Resisting the War Body: Training in the British Army’, in 
McSorley, War and the Body, p. 35. 
20 Newlands, ‘Preparing and Resisting’, p. 47. 
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accounts oscillated between these two ways of talking about military training and 
their lives as soldiers, an ambivalence that marks soldiers’ stories in other contexts 
too.21 On the one hand they often used technical and strategic language to recount the 
effects, rationale and relevance (or otherwise) of components of training and, in so 
doing, often repeated and reflected on the views and arguments of their instructors. 
Indeed, discussions of expertise and efficacy formed an important aspect of soldiers’ 
stories. At the same time, veterans offered reflections on their military experiences 
that explored murky moral and emotional terrains, at times indicating a tension 
between their belief in the necessity of the hierarchies and discipline that were almost 
always central to military training regimes and their experience of these regimes as 
cruel or unjust. 
We rely on oral histories partly owing to the lack of other sources, but more 
importantly because they provide a unique vantage point that allows us to engage 
these complex views on military training. We approached veterans with the assistance 
of several key interlocutors with whom we have worked for several decades: the 
historian Pathisa Nyathi, and Zephaniah Nkomo and Zephaniah Moyo, both ZIPRA 
ex-combatants who are involved in veterans’ organizations based in Zimbabwe’s 
second city, Bulawayo. They are well known within veterans’ circles and are 
identified with different views and groupings across this diverse community. Through 
their connections, we spoke to eleven men about Cuban training. They had been 
teachers, factory workers, labor migrants to South Africa, or school kids before 
joining the struggle in Zambia. Some spent years in Angola, staying on as instructors 
or for specialized training, while others returned to the warfront after the standard six-
month training stint. They had travelled different paths after independence too, some 
serving in the Zimbabwe National Army and others returning to civilian roles. Despite 
these differences, they shared a passionate sense of grievance regarding what they 
saw as the ruling party’s marginalization of ZIPRA’s war history in favor of its own. 
The result was, in their view, a distorted victor’s history born of the tensions of the 
war itself and reinforced by the post-independence state violence of the 1980s in 
which ZAPU and ZIPRA cadres had been subjected to a lengthy campaign of 
detention, torture, and killings. This shared grievance did not however produce a 
monolithic ‘counter-history’. The period in which we undertook our interviews was 
marked by the regular publication in the Zimbabwean media of interviews with 
ZIPRA cadres (some of which we draw on here), which sustained lively debates 
among these now elderly men.22 ZAPU’s war history is living, public, and constantly 
contested both within ZIPRA and between it and its opponents, past and present. For 
all of these reasons, ZIPRA cadres told stories of their heroism and military 
sophistication but also invoked more ambivalent, discordant and particular memories. 
The stories of this cohort of Angolan-trained ZIPRA veterans brought to light 
aspects of military life we had not previously grasped. In our earlier work on ZIPRA, 
we had argued that soldiers’ narratives were structured as stages on a journey, marked 
by the crossing of rivers and borders and the survival of ordeals.23 Becoming a ZIPRA 
cadre was widely told as a story of achieving military professionalism, expressed in 
the mastery of weaponry, nature and fear, rigorous discipline, and a political 
understanding of the war as a struggle against an exploitative ‘system’, not simply a 
                                                        
21 See Guttman and Lutz, Breaking Ranks, p. 49. 
22 The key series is the Bulawayo Sunday News’ ‘Lest We Forget’ column, which is based on 
interviews with ZIPRA cadres, largely by the paper’s assistant editor, Mkhululi Sibanda.  
23 Alexander and McGregor, ‘War Stories’.  
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racial enemy.24 Being ‘professional’ stood at the heart of ZAPU soldiers’ military 
imaginaries in these accounts, and was constructed in opposition to ZANU’s armed 
wing, which was parodied as a barely trained rabble. While the Angola-trained 
soldiers’ oral histories echoed this broad narrative, delving into training itself in the 
context of a wider set of lively debates about ZIPRA’s history raised questions 
beyond the generic notion of the professional soldier, revealing discrete military 
imaginaries that had co-existed within this army, and powerfully shaped its conduct 
and legacies.   
As we have noted, the variety of military imaginaries in ZIPRA was produced 
in great part by the movement of cadres through numerous camps and the hands of 
different instructors. As with almost all ZIPRA soldiers, the Angolan-trained cadres 
started their military lives in the Zambian camps, a formative moment that would 
begin a lengthy process of transformation.  
 
Encountering Military Life in Zambia 
First encounters with military life, often in the form of ‘basic training’, loom large in 
soldiers’ memories. As McSorley writes, basic training constitutes ‘the classic site of 
militarisation’, where military values, hierarchies and automated corporeal repertoires 
are first inculcated into civilians.25 Writing about Bolivian conscripts, Lesley Gill 
casts basic training as ‘a gendered process of moral regulation’ that ‘subordinates 
individuality to the identity of the male group and instills rigid conformity and 
compliance to military values’, often in violent and abusive ways.26 Gutmann and 
Lutz, writing about American marines, similarly stress the physical and emotional 
violence of basic training. One of their interviewees described it as a means through 
which ‘they break you down into a big ball of clay’ and then introduce new forms of 
discipline through drill.27 Soviet basic training has likewise relied on systems of 
subordination and violence, coupled with political surveillance.28 
Basic training is intended to produce military forms of discipline; it also 
displaces prior understandings of soldiery and societal myths about war in ways that 
reflect distinct historical and institutional contexts. For conventional armies, the key 
instigator of change in this regard is state politics and practice.29 In the case of 
ZAPU’s war, it was the camps themselves. While hardships and harsh discipline were 
common across southern African liberation movement camps, their practices also 
reflected particular histories and so took distinctive forms. 
In the second half of the 1970s, ZAPU’s camp regime faced new challenges 
owing to the rapid escalation of the war. ZIPRA’s main site of induction for new 
arrivals was Nampundwe camp, one of a fast-expanding network of ZAPU camps in 
Zambia. Most of our interviewees arrived at the camp in 1976 and 1977, at the 
moment of a great surge of young people into Zambia. Indeed, Brickhill estimates 
                                                        
24 In describing this process of often uncomfortable transformation, ZIPRA soldiers echo life stories of 
soldiers elsewhere. See e.g. Gutmann and Lutz, Breaking Ranks, pp. 1-11.  
25 McSorley, War and the Body, p. 13. And see Bickford, Fallen Elites, chapter 2; Newlands, 
‘Preparing and Resisting’; Ben Ari, Mastering Soldiers, chapter 4. 
26 Gill, ‘Creating Citizens’, p. 534. 
27 Gutmann and Lutz, Breaking Ranks, p. 47. 
28 See e.g. discussions in Roger Reese, The Soviet Military Experience (London, Routledge, 2000), 
chapter 6, and Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War 
(Coulsdon, Surrey, Jane’s Information Group, 1988), chapter 9. 
29 See Bickford, Fallen Elites.  
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half of all ZIPRA recruits arrived in 1977 alone.30 In this context, ZAPU struggled to 
meet logistical and security demands while fears of infiltration spread, a situation 
greatly exacerbated in 1978 when the Rhodesian Air Force carried out a devastating 
series of bombings of the camps. A heightened concern for discipline, loyalty and 
fitness among Nampundwe’s instructors flowed from these conditions, as well as 
from two additional factors. The first was the influence of a longer transnational 
history of the camps. Many of the key figures in Nampundwe’s administration had 
had what they described as traumatic experiences of violent clashes between ZANU 
and ZAPU cadres in guerrilla training camps in Tanzania (the outcome of failed 
efforts to unify the two movements on the part of their host governments). These 
experiences had convinced them that ‘strong training’ – able to produce fitness, 
discipline and an unshakeable political loyalty – was necessary for the survival of 
both ZAPU itself and the new recruits.31 The second factor was camp instructors’ 
awareness of the new demands created by shifts in military strategy. They wanted to 
produce men who were ‘trainable’ subjects for the foreign militaries around the world 
to whom they were now sending thousands of young men. In the words of Cetshwayo 
Sithole, an influential instructor at Nampundwe, their international supporters could 
not be offered ‘the indiscipline of an untrained unit’.32  
The pressures that had produced the basic training regime in Nampundwe 
were unknown to the young men and women who had set off from Zimbabwe to join 
the armed struggle. In common with many arrivals of this era, our interviewees 
described having set out on the circuitous route to Zambia after being caught up in the 
‘spirit of war’ as news of fighting spread and they encountered guerrillas directly or 
heard tales of them. Some had family histories of nationalist activism and were urged 
to join by older relatives, or had themselves been involved in protest and sabotage as 
members of ZAPU’s youth wing. Many were motivated by the calls to cross the 
border broadcast on ZAPU’s radio transmissions from Zambia, notably those by the 
legendary Jane Ngwenya. Whatever their motivation, their understanding of what 
would happen on arrival in Zambia was a far cry from the reality. Most explained that 
they had expected a rapid turn-around, an expectation shared by new arrivals across 
all liberation movements: ‘We just thought maybe when we get there we will be given 
guns on the same day,’ Ndaba Maqeda remembered.33 In an interview in 2017, Jane 
Ngwenya recalled the many complaints of the young men who had responded to her 
call to ‘get the gun and go back to fight’ only to be ‘shocked to find out that they were 
to undergo a rigorous military training exercise before taking the gun’.34  
Veterans identified the induction ritual at Nampundwe, known as ‘meeting the 
old man’, as the moment when their civilian understanding of war was displaced by 
                                                        
30 Brickhill, ‘Daring to Storm’, p. 66. For a vivid account of camps in Zambia see Mary Ndlovu, ZAPU 
through Zenzo Nkobi’s lens (Braamfontein, SAHA, n.d.). 
31 Interview, Cetshwayo Sithole, by Jocelyn Alexander and Pathisa Nyathi, Bulawayo, 20 December 
2017. Sithole recalled that many of Nampundwe’s instructors were survivors of the ‘Mgagao 
massacre’, in which some 50 (of 800) unarmed ZIPRA trainees were gunned down in clashes with 
Chinese instructors and ZANU trainees. The event remains a source of great outrage for many ZIPRA 
veterans. 
32 Interview, Cetshwayo Sithole, by Jocelyn Alexander and Pathisa Nyathi, Bulawayo, 21 December 
2017. 
33 Interview, Ndaba Maqeda, by Jocelyn Alexander, Bulawayo, 27 December 2017. This view was also 
common in the ANC’s armed wing. See Ngculu, The Honour to Serve; Wonga Welile Bottoman, The 
Making of an MK Cadre (Pretoria, LiNc Publishers, 2010). 
34 See ‘Cde Ngwenya: last woman standing’, Sunday News, 18 June 2017, and Alexander and 
McGregor, ‘War Stories’, pp. 84-6.  
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something hitherto unimaginable, in an echo of many soldiers’ tales of the prior 
‘unknowability’ of military worlds.35 ‘Meeting the old man’ was intended by the 
camp’s instructors to do precisely that. Cetshwayo Sithole recounted designing a 
‘welcome’ that ‘introduced you into a system, a system that will make you know that 
you are in a war zone’: it was meant to ‘mold’ the recruit ‘into a formation that is 
controllable’.36 New arrivals at first understood the ‘old man’ to be ZAPU President 
Joshua Nkomo, a fatherly figure of heroic proportions who had recently been released 
from detention and gone into exile: it made sense that he would warmly welcome 
them. What came next was remembered as a terrible shock. Green Mpofu, previously 
a machinist in a Bulawayo factory, recounted how he and his group had arrived at the 
camp filled with ‘excitement’, believing they were ‘already part of the struggle’.37 On 
their first night, they were taken aback by the lack of blankets, the filth, and the 
‘thousands of people … milling in all directions’. The next morning they were told 
they were ‘going to meet the old man, Nkomo’ on a nearby rocky hill. Mpofu 
remembered men rushing to put on their best attire in giddy anticipation. Once at the 
hill:   
 
Things went topsy turvy, upside down. When we got there, it was tough.… Right, 
crawl, go down, crawl, roll, crawl. There was no time to say, no these trousers are 
special or what. Things got out of hand…. There was no time to pity anyone. We 
rolled, crawled, others [were] vomiting.... [It’s] difficult to describe. We couldn’t 
imagine this, we were being conditioned…. I became extremely thirsty… and 
asked ‘can I have a drink’. I still remember the laughter which he [the instructor] 
emitted: ‘this one here is saying he wants water!’ Go down, crawl. It was as if I’d 
insulted him by asking for a drink.… It was an introduction to the system. That 
was the initiation. It was said we’d met the old man. That was the meeting.38 
 
These tales of ‘meeting the old man’ were often recounted with dark humor – at the 
destruction of the fine suits foolishly donned to impress Joshua Nkomo, or in the 
memorable obscenities of the instructors whose language was ‘just a bag of insults’.39 
But ‘meeting the old man’ stood out in veterans’ accounts above all as a story of their 
shocking subjection to an authority that claimed power over bodies and emotions 
without sympathy. As Bonus Hlabangana put it: ‘we cried, we were kicked.’40 
‘Everyone then knew it was war’, recalled Jabulani Sibanda.41 This moment 
delineated a militarist control and masculinity that echoed those of state militaries, but 
which was produced here by the regime of liberation movement camps.42  
The lessons of this ‘welcome’ were, in veterans’ stories, reinforced in the 
course of daily training regimes in which dissent was equated with treason, non-
                                                        
35 E.g. see Rachel Woodward and K. Neil Jenkings, ‘Soldiers’ Bodies and the Contemporary British 
Military Memoir’, in McSorley, War and the Body, pp. 152-64. 
36 Interview, Sithole, 21 December 2017. 
37 Green Mpofu in Group Interview, Bonus Hlabangana, Charles Makhuya and Green Mpofu, by 
Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Zephaniah Nkomo, Bulawayo, 18 August 2016. 
38 Group Interview, Mpofu. 
39 Interviews, Mark Mbayiwa, by Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, Bulawayo, 21 August 
2016; Jabulani Sibanda, by Jocelyn Alexander and Pathisa Nyathi, Nyamandhlovu, 26 August 2016; 
Nico Ndlovu, by Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, Bulawayo, 22 August 2016; Sithole, 21 
December 2017. 
40 Group Interview, Hlabangana. 
41 Interview, Sibanda. 
42 See Katz, ‘Emotional Metaphors’, pp. 458-60.   
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military solidarities among recruits (the bonds of home such as ethnicity, region, 
kinship, or friendship) were targeted and sundered, and individuals’ expendability 
was made clear in the use of severe corporal punishment.43 This regime shattered 
some men’s sense of justice and mutual obligation, leaving them with uncomfortable 
memories. Green Mpofu recounted an incident of collective punishment, meted out 
following a minor incident of theft. He had not participated in the theft but his 
protests only earned him an accusation of treason. His fellow recruits from home felt 
unable to defend him for fear of being accused in turn. Mpofu counted himself lucky 
to have survived his physical punishment. He explained: ‘before you understand 
military discipline, you think you can resist certain things. You don’t appreciate.’ 
Mpofu’s terrible story was followed by an ambivalent rationalization. He circled 
between his ongoing sense of injustice and his soldier’s understanding of the 
requirements of war: ‘That situation, it still rankles. I’m not bitter about it – I 
understood it was guerrilla war.… The reason was military discipline and security. If 
they compromised on such issues, they’d lose a lot of people. So I understood that. 
But it was really a bitter experience.’44  
Ambivalence about this initial period of training was also owed to the more 
positive and political elements of training, which lightened the lessons in bodily and 
emotional discipline. These elements shared the purpose of creating powerful 
attachments found in state militaries,45 but took a form that reflected the context and 
nature of a liberation struggle. A universal aspect of induction was the process of 
screening new recruits and taking down their biographies, measures intended in part 
to identify ‘sellouts’, and the allocation of war names by which they were known 
henceforward. War names were a marker of inclusion in ZIPRA, a means of securing 
the safety of recruits and their families by rendering them unrecognizable to the 
Rhodesian state. They were also a way of distancing young men from regional and 
ethnic identities, and so placing loyalty to the imagined nation and ZAPU first.46 
Nampundwe was often also the place where recruits had their first political lessons, 
gaining a new, shared clarity regarding the purpose of the struggle. Bonus 
Hlabangana, a former school teacher, remembered classes on the ZAPU Manifesto 
and socialism: ‘We didn’t know much about that, we only knew capitalism, about 
America. We didn’t know much about the Soviet Union, Cuba and so on. So we were 
told about all the eastern countries.’47 Nico Ndlovu, who described himself as part of 
an ‘erudite group’, recalled a library at Nampundwe with books from the ‘USSR, 
Hungary, Cuba and elsewhere’, covering history, politics and ideology. He walked 
around the camp with ‘a book tucked in my belt’.48 
An additional aspect of military training at Nampundwe was the inculcation of 
pride in physical fitness that merged an ideal of manhood with that of the soldier. 
                                                        
43 These are themes in accounts of other liberation movement camps too: see Gerald Mazarire, 
‘Discipline and Punishment in ZANLA: 1964-1979’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 37, 3, 2011, 
pp. 571-92. Displacing social ties and teaching the replaceability of the soldier are common in training 
more widely: e.g., see Guttman and Lutz, Breaking Ranks, pp. 39-55; McNeill, Keeping Together, 
chapter 5; Ben-Ari, Mastering Soldiers, chapter 3.  
44 Group Interview, Mpofu. 
45 Compare to Ben-Ari, Mastering Soldiers, pp. 122-3; Bickford, Fallen Elites, pp. 72-3. 
46 Asking about people’s homes and ethnicity was systematically deterred. See Ndlovu, ZAPU. 
47 Group Interview, Hlabangana. 
48 Interview, Ndlovu, 22 August 2016. Stories of ‘political epiphanies’ are common in ZIPRA soldiers’ 
narratives of camp education. See Alexander and McGregor, ‘War Stories’, p. 89. 
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Young men’s bodies were transformed through daily exercises, runs and drills.49 
Among these exercises was the ubiquitous toyi-toyi, a high-kneed run accompanied 
by song and chant that had been introduced to ZAPU in the Algerian training camps 
of the 1960s. This was an internationalist military performance par excellence, but it 
had been remade to serve ZAPU’s need for nationalist unity and loyalty in the face of 
division.50 The toyi-toyi was performed across all of ZIPRA’s camps, serving as one 
of the recognizable ‘glues’ – in Snider’s terms – that held this army together. The men 
we interviewed emphasized both the harshness of their physical training and their 
pride in their fitness, noting how it had impressed the Cubans and Soviets when they 
arrived in Angola, and comparing themselves favorably to other liberation 
movements, notably the ANC and ZANU. It was only the PLO, they maintained, that 
had a physically tougher training regime, a mythology reinforced by the storied 
careers of the handful of ZIPRA men who had trained in Lebanon, and who had 
themselves become instructors and commanders.51  
Basic training at Nampundwe displaced the ideas about soldiery and war that 
these young men had brought from home with a new, substantial military imaginary, 
forged in and from the transnational history and practices of the camps. For veterans 
recounting these experiences decades later, this passage was vividly recalled as 
marking the start of their understanding of what a ‘proper’ soldier was. The idea of 
getting a gun to fight white settlers was replaced with an understanding of the 
necessity of subjecting bodies, emotions and alternative solidarities to a hierarchical, 
political military authority. This did not, however, satisfy the ‘spirit of war’ that had 
brought these young men to Zambia and it did not create fully obedient military 
subjects, despite the harshness of the disciplinary regime. This was not least because 
these liberation movement camps were large and chaotic. They operated to a great 
extent autonomously from the Zambian state and were permeated by the possibilities 
offered by internationalist solidarity.  
When news began to spread of the arrival of Cubans in the Zambian camps, 
the men we interviewed said they had seen in them the route to the battlefield that 
they craved. In Piero Gleijeses’ account, the first Cuban-manned column of Soviet 
trucks left the Angolan capital Luanda laden with supplies, making the 4,622 
kilometer trek to Lusaka, and rapidly turning around with over 2,000 ZIPRA cadres 
on board, heading for Boma in North-Eastern Angola.52 In veterans’ accounts, the 
process was considerably more messy. A surprising number said they had in effect 
selected themselves for training.53 Mark Mbayiwa, a skilled factory worker from 
Bulawayo, was working as an electrician in Freedom Camp when the group going to 
Angola gathered there: ‘I said, no, I can’t stay. I must run and join them.’ When the 
trucks arrived, he recounted, ‘I just joined without telling anyone!’54 The 15-year-old 
                                                        
49 On drill and bonding, see McNeill, Keeping Together; Barkawi, ‘Culture and Combat’, p. 354; 
Morgan, ‘Theatre of War’.  
50 See Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, ‘The Travelling Toyi-Toyi: Soldiers and the Politics 
of Drill’, Journal of Southern African Studies, forthcoming in 2020.  
51 These include the current commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, General P. V. Sibanda. 
Interview, Sithole, 20 December 2017; Group Interview, Mpofu; Abel Mazinyane, ‘In Remembrance 
of Comrades who Never Lived to See Independent Zim: Alexander (Assaf Ndinda) Katema’, Sunday 
News, 3 May 2015. 
52 Gleijeses, Visions, p. 86.   
53 See also Abel Mazinyane, ‘Cuba’s contribution to liberation struggle for Southern Africa’, Sunday 
News, 12 July 2015, on Cubans adding recruits without consulting ZIPRA representatives. 
54 Interview, Mark Mbayiwa, by Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Pathisa Nyathi, Bulawayo, 
18 August 2016. 
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school boy Charles Makhuya, due to be sent to a camp for those too young to fight, 
also simply jumped into a truck. He remembered: ‘The Cubans loved us, as 
youngsters, [they said] come inside!’55 Henry Jabulani Sibasa had been deployed in 
intelligence work at Nampundwe as part of a platoon that took down new arrivals’ 
biographies. This was in his view a ‘civilian job’: he ‘wanted to go fight’. His entire 
platoon jumped into a nighttime convoy of trucks, using their ‘influence’ as 
intelligence cadres to silence the drivers’ objections.56 
The stories of the journey to the Boma camp, where these men would be the 
guests of Angola’s MPLA government, depict a passage into a shocking landscape of 
war. Most of the first recruits made the trip packed in the backs of Soviet-made KrAZ 
trucks, a vehicle whose noise and discomfort peppers veterans’ accounts. The journey 
usually took 5 to 6 days and traversed regions that had seen heavy fighting amongst a 
host of armed groups, itself a terrifying lesson in war and its international, chaotic 
character. These included the armies of the MPLA and its opponent UNITA in 
Angola, the separatist Katangese gendarmes in Zaire’s border zones, and shadowy 
rebels in northern Zambia.57 Ndaba Maqeda was part of an advance party of 300 that 
took 14 days to arrive in Boma, travelling via what was then Zaire. He remembered it 
was ‘hot’ in Zaire because of the ‘Katangese’. Their first task on arrival in Boma was 
‘to clear Savimbi [UNITA] from that area’.58 Brian Hlongwane remembered the 
Cubans searching for insurgents in Zambia: ‘that’s when I realized how serious they 
were from a military point of view’.59 Charles Makhuya recalled a landscape marked 
with ‘old and empty buildings’: ‘we were shocked! You could see the bullet holes, 
marks, where the fighting had been taking place.’60 
These unnerving passages delivered these men to Boma, underlining the sense 
of distance between the social and military world of Nampundwe and what was to 
come. These young men were about to enter another liberation movement camp, in 
this instance run by Soviet and Cuban advisers and instructors who brought their own 
military expertise, traditions and internationalist politics. It was in this environment 
that our interviewees took on the military identity that would last a lifetime.  
 
The Soviet and Cuban Regime in Boma Camp 
Angolan-trained ZIPRA veterans looked back on the material conditions and spatial 
order of Boma camp with far greater warmth than they did Nampundwe. Their 
memories also differ markedly from the negative or civilian-oriented images of ‘the 
camp’ in studies of southern African liberation movements generally. They described 
a regime of order and care alongside a set of military exchanges, both of which were 
rooted in an appealing, militarized version of internationalist solidarity that they 
credited primarily to their Cuban instructors. We first discuss the institutions of order 
and care offered in Boma before turning to military training proper, the powerful 
military imaginary it produced, and the ways in which it would reshape this army and 
war. 
                                                        
55 Group Interview, Makhuya. 
56 Interview, Henry Jabulani Sibasa, by Jocelyn Alexander, Bulawayo, 24 August 2016. Also see 
interview, Sibanda. 
57 See Erik Kennes and Miles Larmer, The Katangese Gendarmes and War in Central Africa 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2016). 
58 Interview, Maqeda. 
59 Interview, Brian Hlongwane, by Jocelyn Alexander and Pathisa Nyathi, Bulawayo, 27 July 2017. 
60 Group Interview, Makhuya. Also see, interview, Sibasa, and Mary Ndlovu’s interview with Moses 
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History Archive (SAHA). 
 13 
The possibility of creating a more positive environment for training in 
ZAPU’s Angola camps as compared to those in Zambia was in part owed to their 
smaller scale, distance from the warfront and clear goal: preparing men to fight. The 
vast complex of ZAPU’s Zambian camps was home to tens of thousands of refugees, 
children, women, new recruits and peripatetic battle-tested soldiers, all within reach 
of Rhodesian attack. Boma’s trainees were entirely young and male and Boma’s 
remote location outside the town of Luena (formerly Vila Luso) insulated it from the 
Zambian rumor mill and the sometimes divisive machinations of ZAPU’s political 
and military leadership, as well as – initially –from Rhodesian attack. Boma’s 
command structure was remembered as clear cut: at the apex were Soviet officers and 
the ZIPRA liaison officer and political commissar.61 The Soviets supplied the 
weaponry and uniforms while the much larger number of Cubans took charge of 
security and logistics, including preparing the camp, providing food and water to its 
inhabitants, and undertaking the bulk of military instruction. The Cubans, not the 
ZIPRA or Soviet leaders, were the main point of contact and source of authority for 
men in Boma. A second, smaller camp, known as Luso, was run directly by Soviet 
officers and focused on training tank, armored car, and amphibious vehicle crews.62 
Our interviewees emphasized that the clarity of the military hierarchy was reinforced 
in the physical layout of the camps. The Cubans and Soviets were housed separately 
from the trainees and they drank in separate spaces, underpinning their authority with 
physical and social distance.63  
In Boma, the roughly 2,000 ZIPRA trainees present at any given time were 
divided into 12 companies, each with its own command structures and ‘barracks’, 
rows of long sheds without walls where cadres slept in hammocks.64 Veterans 
remembered Boma’s conditions as a great – and deeply appreciated – improvement 
on Nampundwe. Brian Hlongwane contrasted his ‘very, very comfortable’ hammock 
with his experience of sleeping on the ground in Nampundwe, where one’s blanket 
might be stolen in the dead of night.65 Green Mpofu painted a vivid picture of his 
humanity restored by Boma’s material conditions:  
 
[In] Nampundwe, sanitation was a problem…. The amount of lice which each 
comrade had, right from the head, into the seams of the trousers, all lice. 
When you parade, you weren’t allowed to scratch – it was said this louse is 
your comrade, don’t scratch! So when we got to Angola, we were in tatters all 
of us, tatters. The Cubans were organized for that. We had to throw away all 
those tattered things and got new clothing, boots, razor blades to shave our 
heads. We became human again.66  
 
Uniforms, razors, and hammocks did not, however, mean an end to physical 
hardship. Quite the opposite – developing the capacity for bodily endurance was at 
the heart of the Cuban regime. This capacity was strongly associated with food. The 
Angolan trainees took on the nickname bafana we gapha – ‘the boys of the tins’, a 
                                                        
61 Interview, Maqeda. The first ZIPRA liaison officer was Tshile Nleya, deputized by the political 
commissar, Ronald Tshoka, nicknamed ‘Botsheni’, who later became ZIPRA’s camp commander at 
Boma. Interview, Snowman Moyo and Charles Makhuya, by Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, 
Bulawayo, 20 December 2019. 
62 See Mazinyane, ‘Zim, Angola Friendship’. 
63 E.g., Interview, Hlongwane. 
64 Group Interview, Hlabangana, Makhuya and Mpofu. 
65 Interview, Hlongwane. 
66 Group Interview, Mpofu. 
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reference to the notoriously meager rations of rice and beans the Cubans cooked and 
measured out in small tins. Trainees remembered becoming ‘very thin’; they recalled 
lodging complaints – even writing to Lusaka – over the small portions and 
specifically the absence of the maize porridge that formed the Zimbabwean staple, 
and which they considered essential to well-being.67 Our interviewees did not, 
however, cast the Cuban food regime as a sign of dearth or lack of care: it was 
portrayed as a military diet intended to create a lean body able to endure the physical 
demands of war. Mark Mbayiwa held that the Cubans ‘didn’t believe in large 
quantities of food. They believed in small quantities, but very nutritious. 
Zimbabweans were complaining…. But the reality was the foodstuff was enough, you 
just needed to get used to it.’68 For Green Mpofu, the culinary regime was ‘part of the 
training’: a soldier could not go into battle with ‘a bulging stomach’.69  
If the Cuban army diet created the identity bafana we gapha and imbued it 
with pride in bodily endurance and a thin physique, the pervasive hunger also, in the 
words of Nico Ndlovu, ‘made us rascals’. This was another aspect of the identity 
embraced by Angolan-trained men.70 Veterans recounted tales of sneaking out of the 
camp at night into the nearby villages to trade cigarettes for food or to steal from 
fields. Ndlovu recalled the ‘strained public relations’ that resulted from trainees’ 
nighttime raids for cassava, green maize or paw-paw. Serious though these tensions 
were, such stories were told with laughter and linked to ‘formal and informal military 
training’. Ndlovu recounted an incident in which his group of raiders were ‘attacked 
by villagers, with bows and arrows, just threatening us. But we were also practicing 
our retreat!’71 Henry Sibasa remembered his unit using their artillery training to shell 
villagers’ fields so as to unearth the cassava. They snuck out of the camp at night ‘to 
go and collect’, using skirmishing tactics to make it in and out undetected. We were 
‘naughty guys, very adventurous’, he explained.72 
These and other disciplinary breaches did not go undetected. However, the 
Cuban disciplinary regime was not described as unjust or disproportionate, in contrast 
to Nampundwe. The Cubans were credited with working to keep good relations with 
neighboring villagers, for example through food distributions, despite trainees’ raids. 
Punishments for acts such as leaving the camp without permission, stealing from 
villagers or insubordination most commonly consisted of extended physical drill.73 
This was recalled as harsh but commensurate. In veterans’ accounts, Cuban discipline 
appeared to recognize, even embrace, the military utility of inventive rule-breaking, 
casting it as the work of clever rascals not of traitors, and punishing it accordingly. 
The worst incidents of breakdowns of discipline – a soldier who deserted, a suicide – 
were attributed not to the effects of an intolerable military regime, but to particular 
individuals’ inability to cope with the emotional stress of war and soldiering.74 The 
only accounts of excessive corporal punishment involved not the Cubans but ZIPRA 
camp commander Ronald Tshoka.75 
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68 Interview, Mbayiwa, 21 August 2016. Also see Interview, Ndlovu, 22 August 2016. 
69 Group Interview, Mpofu. 
70 Interview, Nldovu, 22 August 2016. 
71 Interview, Ndlovu, 22 August 2016. 
72 Interview, Sibasa. Also, Interview, Hlongwane. 
73 Interviews, Sibasa; Bonus Hlabangana, by Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Zephaniah 
Nkomo, Bulawayo, 22 August 2016. 
74 For example, Interview, Ben Matiwaza, by Jocelyn Alexander and Pathisa Nyathi, Bulawayo, 27 
July 2017; Group Interview, Makhuya.   
75 Interview, Moyo and Makhuya. 
 15 
Veterans credited the Cuban regime with inculcating levels of trust that 
survived two major challenges: a devastating outbreak of disease in mid-1977 and the 
Rhodesian bombing of Boma and Luso camps in February 1979. This trust was not 
solely a result of the Cubans per se: in contemporaneous ANC camps in Angola, 
relations with Cuban instructors were at times poor, in part owing to the lack of 
access to the war front and related lack of purpose attached to rigorous training, and 
in part it seems to relations with the more intrusive ANC commanders. In the ANC’s 
case, parallel outbreaks of disease and bombing caused deep distrust and dissension 
and threatened the authority of the camp command.76 In Boma, memories differed 
starkly. While loss of life was substantial as a result of both the bombing and the 
outbreak, neither produced narratives of blame or betrayal. ZIPRA veterans’ accounts 
instead emphasized the efforts made by the camp command to care for them, and cast 
such efforts as evidence of internationalist solidarities and technical capacity. Stories 
of the disease outbreak detailed the terrible and terrifying suffering of men struck 
down by a mysterious sickness, but they also stressed that the Cubans and Soviets had 
brought international teams of medical doctors to Boma – from Cuba, the USSR, 
Angola and ZIPRA’s Zambian camps – to investigate and treat the sick: they were 
thus able to ‘save the situation’.77 Likewise, in accounts of the devastating Rhodesian 
bombings, in which hundreds died and many more were severely injured, veterans 
told of both the lasting horror of these losses and the impressive response of the camp 
regime in its aftermath.78 The attack had taken both camps by surprise, catching men 
gathered for arrival and departure in the case of Boma, and little effective resistance 
was mounted.79 To the extent that blame was allocated, it was to the possible enablers 
of the Rhodesian attack – Rhodesia’s allies or informers in the camp.80 Veterans 
praised the camp command, along with the Angolan military and local civilians, for 
the evacuation and treatment of the injured in Luena’s hospitals and for airlifting 
others to facilities in Luanda. Decades later, such actions were remembered as 
profoundly moving expressions of solidarity.81 
These accounts of Boma’s material conditions, physical layout and 
disciplinary regime provided the foundation for a new military imaginary. The ‘boys 
of the tin’ linked their bodily endurance to the Cuban diet, and the hardships of 
hunger to the flourishing of a ‘rascal’ character with military applications. Their 
confidence in the Cuban regime was deepened through the demonstration of 
internationalist solidarity and technical capacity in the face of the existential threats 
posed by disease and bombing. In this context, soldiers embraced the Cuban regime 
of military training.   
 
Training and Military Imaginaries: Adelante!  
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Veterans variously labeled the training offered at Boma as ‘conventional’, ‘semi-
conventional’, ‘semi-regular’ or ‘advanced guerrilla warfare’.82 They depicted the 
standard training as a combination of guerrilla and infantry tactics, with some 
companies specializing in engineering (sabotage), communications, anti-tank warfare, 
or mortars, alongside the more technical training in Luso camp. They described 
themselves as able to operate in large units (the basic unit was a company of 100, 
divided into 3 platoons) and to use sophisticated communications systems and heavy 
weaponry.83 In Shubin’s account, the ‘syllabus’ was ‘Soviet’: he writes that ‘the main 
task of the Soviets was to train them in the tactics of regular units’, though guerrilla 
tactics were also taught.84 For our interviewees, the training was decidedly ‘Cuban’, a 
label filled out with a great range of meanings and feelings linked to Cuba’s military 
history and politics. 
Veterans’ shorthand for the Cuban military regime was the exhortation 
‘Adelante!’ This Spanish word was a battle cry, an attitude, a politics and a strategy 
that together made up a distinctive military imaginary. What did ‘Adelante!’ mean? 
Most obviously and literally it meant going forward and expressed a particular 
‘feeling’ for war that informed all aspects of training.85 Our interviewees used the 
term to mark an explicit contrast with the military imaginary of the guerrilla. 
Guerrillas attacked and retreated; the Cuban-trained soldier attacked and attacked 
again. As Green Mpofu explained, ‘The type of training we got was different from 
that in Zambia. The Cubans didn’t really speak of withdrawal. They always used the 
words Adelante! Advance! Forwards! They never spoke of going backwards. So, it 
was motivating!’86 The Cuban view, Mark Mbayiwa explained, could be summed up 
as, ‘Never give your back to the enemy. You must fight. Adelante! Adelante!’ In 
contrast, guerrillas ‘were operating in small groups, firing some shots, mov[ing] away 
from the area.’87 These formulations pervaded every account: Witness Bhebhe 
invoked the slogan ‘forward ever, backward never’; Ndaba Maqeda recalled the shift 
from the guerrillas’ ‘sabotage and run’ to ‘hit and advance’, a tactical change that 
enabled ‘advancing and putting the flags in the liberated zones’. Ben Matiwaza 
interpreted the lesson in terms of masculinity: the Cubans taught you to ‘be a man’; 
‘They didn’t want you to run. They said, no, the enemy must run.’88   
Adelante was closely identified with veterans’ understandings of Cuban 
military traditions and internationalism. It built on the heroization of Cuban leaders 
like Fidel Castro and Che Guevara and stories of their military victories at home and 
abroad. Our interviewees stressed the high morale produced by Cuban instructors’ 
stories of combat in defense of the MPLA in Luanda in 1975/76, or stories of older 
victories against Batista in Cuba.89 These tales were seen as proof of Cuban trainers’ 
personal fierceness and know how: ‘they have done this, they have done that, so there 
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is nothing that can stop us from winning’, Ndaba Maqeda explained.90 They were also 
taken as evidence of Cuban solidarity. Jabulani Sibanda explained that Cubans were 
‘internationalists’ – they gave up meat one day a week, he said, to support others’ 
struggles; men such as Che Guevara ‘put their lives on the line to liberate others.’91 
Green Mpofu explained, ‘our cadres were very clear about the motivations of the 
Cubans in Angola, and they understood the principle of internationalism. So we were 
quite at home with the Cubans.’92 Race played a role in these narratives of solidarity 
too. Some described a sense of shared African identity with black Cuban soldiers, 
elaborated through stories about slavery and racial oppression in the Caribbean: 
‘Their forefathers turned out to be slaves [who] were taken to America…. It was very 
clear to us. We had the connection as Africans.’93 The Cuban instructors were of all 
skin colors, however, and veterans described what were sometimes awkward 
exchanges with white instructors, the lessons of which were ultimately that the 
sacrifices of socialist internationalism trumped racial difference. ‘Ideology’, Ndaba 
Maqeda explained, ‘has nothing to do with the skin’.94  
The trainees also held that the Cubans had taught them to be ‘arrogant’. Brian 
Hlongwane recounted the horror of the Cuban instructors at one trainee, a man who 
had spent many years working on the South African mines, who could not give up the 
habit of saying ‘baas’ – even ‘to somebody who’s teaching [you] not to say baas’.95 
The Cubans’ use of the word jefe (chief) was universally remembered, and associated 
with a heroization of Castro as well as an unlimited ambition that appealed to these 
young men: ‘whenever they spoke of Fidel Castro in Spanish they’d say ‘Jefe’, ‘Jefe 
de todo el mundo [chief of all the world]’: ‘We all wanted to be like that’.96 Charles 
Makhuya remembered the effects of his instructors’ exhortations: ‘Don’t believe 
Smith can defeat you. You are a jefe of Smith! They boosted morale!’97 Bonus 
Hlabangana recalled that the Cubans had made them feel able to defeat the Rhodesian 
enemy: ‘They said, Zimbabwe is a small country. In a day or two they’d be drinking 
tea with us in Salisbury.’98 
This ‘never reverse’ set of attitudes was given credence by the Cubans’ history 
of fighting in Angola. It was also underpinned by confidence in the power of Soviet 
weaponry. Luise White has argued that the AK was the pre-eminent ‘icon of the 
struggle’ in Zimbabwe, but in everyday usage it was given local meanings mediated 
by political loyalties.99 Our interviewees echoed these insights, but also elaborated on 
a wider range of weaponry, and tied them to internationalist politics. Ndaba Maqeda 
noted the advantages of the AK rifle over the enemy’s FN, and stressed the powers of 
82 mm mortars – ‘you would feel covered with it, … you would even foresee that, ah 
no, we will win’.100 The ‘Katyusha’, a mobile multiple rocket launcher first used in 
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World War II, was the subject of a particular mythology, though it was not used on 
the Zimbabwean battlefield. As Charles Makhuya recounted:  
 
When they told us the story of defending Luanda against the South Africans, 
they said Fidel Castro told them that the enemy is now about 30 kilometers 
from capturing Luanda…. We’re told by those who participated that they 
started to fire those Katyushas … and managed to bury the South Africans … 
under the sand. [They said,] So you guys will be powerful. We’ve got the gun, 
if you go to the front, we’ll supply you with that gun. So go forward, move 
forward, because the Katyusha is at the back!101  
 
The Katyusha was cast as a symbol of the overwhelming military power made 
possible by international solidarity. Mark Mbayiwa recalled Joshua Nkomo promising 
that ‘Katyusha is coming’, a phrase that was echoed in and outside Zimbabwe.102 
All of these attributes were central to ZIPRA trainees’ accounts of the ‘high 
morale’ inspired by the Cubans. They encouraged a belief in a training regime that 
demanded tremendous physical rigor, itself in keeping with an already established 
ZIPRA guerrilla identity, and emphasized technical know-how and live ammunition 
exercises. Green Mpofu recounted, ‘The slogan was “the sweat which we shed in 
training is the blood we’ll save in battle”.’103 Soldiers’ stories linked together drill, the 
acquisition of technical capacities and learning to overcome fear. Green Mpofu, who 
was assigned to the anti-tank company, recalled his own difficulty in adapting to the 
Cuban regime: 
 
we trained, hard as it was in terms of rations and the physical aspect. And 
some of the equipment we’d never seen before, such as mortars, anti-tank, 
communications. It wasn’t that easy to familiarize ourselves. From a civilian 
point of view, now you’re dealing with these explosives. First you have that 
ever-present personal fear, until you get rid of it…. Also, using guns, then 
using that live ammunition. Most of us we didn’t have a problem after some 
time, gradually.104 
 
The importance of live ammunition training was stressed by many of the 
veterans in an echo of a wider literature on the importance of live fire training in 
allowing soldiers to ‘anticipate some of the immediate shock of combat’.105 Ndaba 
Maqeda identified live fire training as the single most important advantage of the 
Cuban training over that received by other ZIPRA units.106 Bonus Hlabangana agreed: 
‘The advantage of the Cubans was the live ammunition – so much! – compared to 
other camps. That helped a lot when we came back. Also the anti-tanks – so loud! It 
would be shaking the floor. Then when we came home, they’d be using small 
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weapons, like playthings.’107 Live fire exercises, Witness Bhebhe argued, had 
prepared them for the demands of ‘real war’.108  
A pass out parade was held for the first group of Boma graduates before they 
set out on the arduous return trip to Zambia. The most important dignitary in 
attendance was ZAPU President Joshua Nkomo, the ‘old man’ these veterans had 
hoped – but failed – to meet in their initiation at Nampundwe. This was a very 
different occasion from that shocking introduction to military ways. Those standing 
with Nkomo included ZIPRA commander Nikita Mangena, deputy chief of operations 
Assaf Ndinda, and chief of military intelligence Abel Mazinyane. Their presence in 
Boma was a marker of the importance of the Angolan-trained men to ZAPU’s fast 
expanding war and shifting strategy. Mangena regaled the men with stories of military 
successes back home.109 The Angolan-trained troops reciprocated by demonstrating 
the power of Adelante! Mazinyane recalled a ‘mock attack by the entire 2 000 troops 
using live ammunition’ in which ‘there was a lot of blowing up of things’.110 Mark 
Mbayiwa vividly remembered their performance:  
 
the Russians, the Angolan government, would provide … spotter planes 
bombing in the front, the soldiers are in battle formation, you’re moving in an 
area, attacking the targets and the plane is bombing. If there’s any mistake, 
somebody would die. You’re preparing people to fight…. All these mortars, 
big weapons, they’re firing live weapons, live ammunition.  
 
The show was intended to ‘impress Nkomo. Nkomo was very excited…. He was 
watching, he couldn’t believe it.’ In Mbayiwa’s view, the demonstration had 
convinced Nkomo of the possibilities of a new phase of war: ‘That’s when Nkomo 
started talking about Turning Point’, the strategy that would bring conventional forces 
into play.111  
In this moment, the ‘boys of the tin’ performed a kind of warfare they could 
not have imagined in their Zimbabwean homes or in Zambia’s camps. It expressed a 
mode of fighting encapsulated in the Cuban battle cry ‘Adelante!’ and enabled by the 
mastery of Soviet weaponry. The accounts of these men powerfully conveyed their 
sense of their own transformation, and their belief that it meant a new kind of war 
could be fought. Their formation as soldiers had many of the attributes of 
conventional militaries, but their military imaginaries were forged in an 
internationalist mold, a product of a specific instance of Cold War-era military 
exchange bounded by the camp. In the end, they were but one element in a highly 
diverse army that lacked the overarching discipline of a state. This rendered the 
triumphant performance of the military parade at Boma an ambiguous moment. It 
conveyed soldiers’ pride and sense of possibility, but it was also a vivid 
demonstration of a military imaginary that would prove difficult to accommodate in 
ZIPRA’s fighting machine. 
 
‘Adelante!’ in Zambia: Military imaginaries at war 
For Boma’s graduates, the return to Zambia was remembered as a moment of great 
excitement and expectation: finally, the enemy would be engaged. Nico Ndlovu 
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jokingly said the ideal mode of entry into Zimbabwe would have been ‘by 
parachute’.112 Navigating ZAPU’s military institutions proved a good deal more 
complicated than that. The first group of Angolan-trained soldiers was ready for 
deployment in December 1977; other groups returned in mid-1978 and early 1979, 
while some arrived later in 1979 following the disruption caused by the bombing of 
the Angolan camps or after further training elsewhere. These years were a time of 
rapid change in ZIPRA’s institutional structures, in its goals, capacities and strategies, 
and in the Rhodesian response to ZIPRA’s growing threat. These changes created new 
possibilities but also contributed to tensions among politicians, military commanders 
and soldiers.113 We outline the shifts in ZIPRA’s war before turning to the role played 
in these tensions by the plural military imaginaries that typified the liberation armies 
of the Cold-War era. 
The deployment in 1977 of large numbers of guerrillas trained in Tanzanian 
and Zambian camps, and the strategic decision to base them more permanently in 
Rhodesia under a reorganized command structure, was the necessary prelude to the 
introduction of larger units and heavier weaponry, and eventually the movement of 
conventional units into the country.114 In 1978, these strategies drew the war into 
Zambia as the Rhodesian Air Force and other units infiltrated, attacked and bombed 
ZIPRA’s camps on an unprecedented scale in an attempt to disrupt new deployments. 
Zambia was considered part of the ‘front’ – indeed, it could be more dangerous than 
the battle zones inside Zimbabwe.115 Battles between Rhodesian security forces and 
ZIPRA conventional and other units took place on both sides of the Zambezi River, 
which ran along Zambia’s southern border with Rhodesia.116 The geographical focus 
of ZIPRA’s deployments at the same time shifted decisively from the western regions 
of Matabeleland into the provinces north of Salisbury – notably Mashonaland West – 
from which ZIPRA planned to attack the capital, thus taking soldiers into camps 
along the eastern length of the Zambezi.117 In these years, there were severe logistical 
challenges, including food shortages, owing to the vast increase in numbers of 
soldiers, the spread of camps and fronts, and the intensification of war.118 
The newly trained troops from Boma arrived amidst these momentous shifts, 
eager to fight and unconvinced of the merits of the veteran guerrilla commanders they 
encountered. Henry Sibasa arrived with the first contingent of Angolan-trained troops 
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at Freedom Camp in December 1977. He laughed as he recalled, ‘we seemed to be 
rude, I think. At that time it was caused by eagerness, eagerness to fight’. His attitude 
reflected the confidence acquired through training: ‘I’m from training, I am a trained 
personnel, and you want to treat me like a recruit just because you are a commander 
yet … the military science I know now, it’s more advanced maybe than yours.’ Sibasa 
met orders with arrogance, saying, ‘no, no don’t waste my time, take me home,’ a 
stance he attributed to the Cubans: ‘it came from those guys, they made us very 
confident to fight.’119 Mark Mbayiwa agreed:  
 
The Cubans would tell us the leader would be chosen on the battlefield. So 
when we came from that particular training some people were looking down 
on the leadership as military people. The leadership we had before … were 
trained in guerrilla warfare. Then now you are coming with people trained in 
Angola in a bigger number, trained in guerrilla warfare and conventional 
warfare. Obviously, the general thinking is we know better than these people 
about the war.  
 
He and others also blamed tensions with guerrilla commanders on the way that they 
mixed with soldiers in the camps, a practice that their Cuban training had taught them 
was inappropriate and which they felt compromised commanders’ authority by 
revealing personal weaknesses.120  
The difficulties and dangers of deployment created further tensions. Units of 
the first group from Boma were escorted into the country by seasoned guerrilla 
commanders and mixed with existing units. This was a sensitive process in which the 
new troops had to trust veteran commanders they did not know and whose training 
they did not necessarily respect.121 The process of entering Zimbabwe was fraught 
with danger on both sides of the border owing to the heavy Rhodesian presence and 
surveillance. As Mark Mbayiwa explained, 
 
When people were coming to cross, the Rhodesian forces could easily go to 
the river line, using the feasibility study to judge the likely crossing places, 
and in those areas they’d lay ambushes. So you’d come in, crossing the river, 
you’re fired upon, two, three people die, then those who go back to Lusaka 
were saying the command element is selling [us], which is not the case.122  
 
In a notorious incident, a contingent of the first Angolan-trained group under the 
command of Assaf Ndinda, who had overseen their passout parade at Boma, was 
ambushed by Rhodesian forces on its way to the border, suffering serious losses. 
Some blamed ZIPRA commander Alfred Nikita Mangena; Mangena was himself 
killed by a land mine explosion while investigating the attack.123  
The dynamics behind the tensions and clashes in the Zambian camps did not 
exclusively affect the Angolan-trained troops, and indeed such frustrations afflicted 
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exiled liberation movements in many contexts.124 Little attention has, however, been 
paid to the role played by the military imaginaries created by diverse training regimes, 
though this was one of the key prisms through which Angola-trained soldiers viewed 
these difficulties. As we have seen, there had always been differences among the 
training received by various groups and generations within ZIPRA, and all of our 
interviewees joked that every soldier invariably believed his training to be superior.125 
Brickhill has noted that the conventional units and their powerful weaponry inspired 
feelings of both jealousy and awe on the part of men trained as guerrillas.126 Some of 
the distinctions among soldiers were expressed in comments about collective 
character traits instilled through training. The Angola-trained troops were routinely 
described as ‘arrogant’ and ‘trigger happy’ by other members of ZIPRA.127 As we 
have seen, they often heartily embraced this characterization, considering it fully 
merited by their Cuban training.128  
There was, however, more to it than this – differences were embodied and 
gendered, and colored by an internationalist politics. When Henry Sibasa described 
his cohort as ‘rude’, he went on to explain that their refusal of orders had taken the 
specific form of rejecting the ‘North African march’ that ZIPRA commander Nikita 
Mangena demanded they perform. Such marches were suitable to the ‘sandy areas’ in 
which their ‘seniors’ had been trained, Sibasa held, but not to their own training 
lineage.129 Such rejections underlined a collective attachment to a ‘Cuban’ military 
imaginary. The distinctiveness of this imaginary was vividly elaborated in contrast to 
the ‘conventional soldier’, a category that referred specifically to ZIPRA cadres 
trained at Mulungushi by the Zambian army in what was viewed as a British mode. 
The Angolan-trained soldiers detailed differences in address, saluting and marching, 
and imbued these with political meaning. Sibasa held that ‘those things indicated … 
whether you’re eastern or western’. In Nico Ndlovu’s words, 
 
we thought they were British trained, so the habits were those of the British, 
like ‘Sir’. We didn’t want to call someone ‘Sir’. It implies someone who is 
more important than the next. We considered each other ‘comrades’ because 
we depended on each other. Even the salute – they’d do an open-palmed salute 
like the British. We’d do the Russian salute. 
 
‘How’, Ndlovu asked incredulously, ‘can you salute with the imperialist salute?’130 
Mark Mbayiwa likewise deemed the use of ‘Sir’ to have been ‘derived from a 
colonial point of view’, as opposed to the Cubans’ ‘comrade’.131 Brian Hlongwane 
recounted, with a laugh, that he had rejected the open-palmed salute because it meant 
‘putting the white [of the palm] in the front’ whereas the Cuban salute ‘was smart on 
equality’. He stressed that ‘the Zambians, they were going the British way and we 
were totally different from them, the Cuban and Russian way. It set us apart.’ It 
‘meant divorce from the European system…. We are communist and we are 
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socialists.’132 These contrasts were extended to marching styles. The Angola-trained 
troops marched in the Soviet style, legs lifted high, arms crossing the body, neck 
locked, arrayed in a wide formation, a mode considered to be more technically 
demanding than the ‘lazy’ style of British marching.133 Brian Hlongwane recalled that 
the Mulungushi-trained troops ‘had these funny marches.… I felt they were sissies. 
That was my honest opinion.’134 
The Angola-trained soldiers saw their own embodied military performances as 
revolutionary, energetic and manly, different in all these ways from a ‘western’ and 
‘imperialist’ tradition. But they also distinguished themselves from those they 
characterized as guerrillas. If the conventional soldier’s march was ‘lazy’, even 
effeminate, the guerrillas lifted their knees too high when they marched: ‘even when 
marching, you had to be seen, you had to demonstrate that you are fit’.135 If the term 
‘Sir’ indicated a colonialist inequality, the guerrillas were described as lacking in 
hierarchy. As Mark Mbayiwa explained, ‘The guerrillas wanted to be too 
independent, do things according to their own consciousness, but as the army grew up 
it had to change, and it changed in a painful way.’ For Mbayiwa, being a soldier was 
‘not about having a gun, but understanding the gun. If you’re trained to interact 
properly, you understand to use what weapon, when and how, not just engage in a 
battlefield firing weapons anywhere.’136 Such views invoked the power of 
sophisticated weaponry wielded by large troop numbers, in contrast to the guerrillas’ 
‘one man band’.137 Brian Hlongwane explained: ‘The guerrillas, the older group, they 
were … proud of the fact that they were pioneers in that war, very proud, but we 
would counter and say, but we are here because you failed to get the country.’138 
These different military imaginaries created powerful tensions but also 
brought real, if gradual, change on the battlefield. Some veteran guerrilla commanders 
have described how they baulked at the growing size of the units as conventionally 
trained soldiers entered Rhodesia, some even refusing deployment with them.139 
Some of our interviewees recalled the inflexibility of the conventional units, who 
refused to be put under guerrilla commanders or to be broken up into smaller groups, 
despite lacking the heavy weaponry to defend large formations. They were ‘too 
disciplined’, Henry Sibasa explained, meaning they refused to adapt.140 In the view of 
the bafana we gapha, perhaps unsurprisingly, it was the Angola-trained soldiers who 
had the biggest impact owing to their combination of flexibility, sophisticated 
training, and ferocious attitude. On the battlefield, they were willing to be 
subordinated to experienced guerrilla commanders who knew the terrain and enemy 
well, but they were also able to operate in bigger numbers and they brought with them 
a powerful arsenal, including B10s (Soviet 82 mm recoilless rifles) and mortars, and 
the technical skills to use such weapons effectively. In Brian Hlongwane’s account, 
‘the Angolans were the proudest…. Why, because when they infiltrated the country 
that’s when the war really heated up…. And I think that is perhaps what made them 
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tolerated by the guerrillas, because those could work together.’141 Henry Sibasa, who 
became a commander in ZIPRA’s Southern Front, explained that the Angola-trained 
soldiers and guerrillas were ‘operating as one’. The guerrillas were ‘very experienced 
and … they had great advice for us.’ Sibasa’s group introduced the Cuban ‘hit and 
attack’ tactics over time: ‘at first they could not understand that, but as time went on 
gradually they joined us, they really understood us.’142 Witness Bhebhe put it simply: 
the Angolans became the ‘backbone’ of ZIPRA.143 
 
Conclusion 
The Cuban training of ZAPU’s soldiers in Angola enabled a strategic shift in 
ZIPRA’s war and created a distinctive military imaginary that has endured for some 
forty years. Veterans of the Angolan camps vividly recalled how Cuban instructors 
had transformed their ideas of what it meant to be a ‘proper’ soldier and what kind of 
war they should fight, inculcating a vision of revolutionary semi-conventional warfare 
and a linked set of embodied practices and feelings bolstered by their readings of 
Cuban politics and history. But this imaginary was just one among others developed 
among ZIPRA soldiers trained under the banner of a militarized internationalism. The 
military imaginaries of liberation movement armies were not driven by a single, 
dominating state; ZIPRA soldiers could not be imagined as ‘the state’. They were 
rather produced by disparate camp regimes scattered across the globe, granting 
liberation armies both innovative and unstable qualities.    
 The stories of ZIPRA’s Angolan-trained soldiers draw attention to a neglected 
aspect of Cold War-era exchange – that of military training – and by so doing cast 
light on what made liberation armies unusual in comparison both to conventional 
militaries and the rebel movements of the post-Cold War era. Our account shows just 
how significant these exchanges were in shaping the experiences, technical capacities 
and dispositions of thousands of soldiers. Angolan-trained ZIPRA cadres’ ideas of 
soldiery shaped the advances and tensions of the war effort, and created a prism for 
remembering these military experiences. They saw themselves as distinct from two 
other categories of ZIPRA soldier – the ‘imperialist’ conventional troops produced by 
Zambian training, and the ‘hit and run’ guerrillas produced over decades in a great 
number of far flung camps. Paying attention to the plural military imaginaries of 
liberation armies allows for a new appreciation of them, and of this historical 
moment. 
The focus on camps as places of military training also offers a new view on 
liberation movements’ transnational lives. The rich studies of camps have rarely 
subjected military training per se to scrutiny. Examining this aspect of camp regimes 
allows us to develop new understandings of soldiers’ experiences and memories, 
alongside the military trajectories of liberation armies. Our account shows the camp to 
be the pre-eminent venue for ‘militarisation’, but in highly uneven and shifting ways 
built up over the life of the struggle. From their own experiences of division and 
violence in the Tanzanian camps, Nampundwe’s instructors forged an initiation 
process for the young arrivals in Zambia that was experienced as a brutal shock and 
remembered with deep ambivalence. In our interviewees’ stories, this first encounter 
with military life served as a counterpoint to the elaboration of ‘Adelante’ as military 
imaginary in Angola. When the ‘boys of the tin’ returned to the Zambian camps, they 
did so with a sense of superiority over their one-time guerrilla commanders. These 
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dynamics created new capacities and tensions that powerfully shaped the wars 
liberation movements fought. 
ZIPRA veterans’ accounts of their formation as soldiers by Cuban instructors 
in Angola offer testimony to an extraordinary era of internationalist military 
exchange. The Cuban exhortation ‘Adelante!’ encapsulated a powerful military 
imaginary and stands as testimony to the enduring effects of military training itself, to 
the legacies of Cold War-era international solidarity in soldiers’ memory, and to the 
essential contribution veterans’ oral histories can make to global military history. 
